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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Daoud Chehazeh appeals the May 24, 2010 order of 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his “Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and Stay of Removal Proceedings.”1  
Chehazeh had asked the District Court to declare that the 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) to 
sua sponte reopen removal proceedings against him is 
contrary to law, and he sought an order requiring the BIA to 
                                              
1
 Although Chehazeh titled his petition as one for 
“habeas corpus” relief, it in fact requests other forms of relief 
also, as outlined infra Part I(B)(3).  
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terminate the reopened proceedings.  Because we conclude 
that, under these unusual circumstances, the District Court 
has jurisdiction to review the BIA‟s decision pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., we will reverse the District 
Court‟s order and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. Background 
 
 A. Factual History
2
 
 
Chehazeh is a Syrian native and citizen who, prior to 
1999, lived in Damascus and worked as a travel agent.  As 
part of his business, Chehazeh helped his customers to obtain 
Saudi Arabian work visas through his contacts in the Saudi 
Arabian embassy.  In 1999, one of those contacts allegedly 
defrauded Chehazeh of 7 million Syrian lire that Chehazeh 
had paid to obtain visas.  Chehazeh was left indebted to his 
customers and so borrowed 3.5 million lire from several 
moneylenders to help meet those debts.  Soon afterwards, he 
travelled to Saudi Arabia to confront the person he believed 
had defrauded him.  After failing in that attempt, he came to 
the United States rather than returning to Syria.  He was 
admitted to this country on July 3, 2000, on a non-immigrant 
visa that authorized him to stay here until January 2, 2001.  
                                              
2
 We present the facts as stated in Chehazeh‟s 
testimony at his removal hearing and in his sworn affidavit.  
Although the Immigration Judge found Chehazeh credible, 
the BIA reopened Chehazeh‟s removal proceedings based, in 
part, on questions about the Immigration Judge‟s impartiality.  
We do not, therefore, rely on that credibility finding and draw 
no conclusions about the veracity of Chehazeh‟s statements.   
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His family in Syria subsequently informed him that his 
creditors were pursuing legal action against him and had put a 
lien on his house.  Chehazeh claims he was afraid that if he 
returned to Syria, he would be put in jail, and so he stayed in 
the United States after the expiration of his visa.   
 
Chehazeh settled in Northern Virginia and began 
attending the Dar al Hijra mosque in Falls Church.  Through 
that affiliation, he became acquainted with two Saudi men 
named Hanji Hanjour and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who told him that 
they were in the United States studying to become pilots.  On 
at least one occasion, Hanjour and al-Hazmi visited Chehazeh 
in his apartment.  On September 25, 2001, while watching 
news coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Chehazeh 
recognized pictures of Hanjour and al-Hazmi and heard that 
they were two of the individuals suspected of perpetrating the 
attacks.  Chehazeh “felt compelled to tell the U.S. authorities 
everything [he] knew about Hanjour and Hamzi [sic].”  (App. 
at 41.)  As a result, he made several attempts to contact the 
FBI, but his efforts were impeded by his inability to speak 
English.  Finally, on September 28, 2001, he was able to 
communicate with someone at the FBI and, during an 
interview that day, provided FBI agents with the information 
he had regarding Hanjour and al-Hazmi.  The FBI brought 
him in for additional questioning on October 1, 2001, after 
which – no doubt to his distress – he was detained and placed 
in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”).   
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B. Procedural History 
 
1. The IJ Decision and the Dismissal of the 
INS’s Appeal 
 
On October 19, 2001, the INS issued a Notice to 
Appear charging Chehazeh with being a removable alien.  He 
did not dispute his removability but submitted an application 
for asylum and sought withholding of removal and relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Prior to a 
merits hearing on his application, Chehazeh was transferred 
back to FBI custody on a material witness warrant.  Although 
the timing is unclear, it appears that Chehazeh bounced 
between INS and FBI custody from November 2001 until the 
date of the eventual hearing on his asylum application on 
May 24, 2002.
3
   
 
During that hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
granted Chehazeh‟s application for asylum pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(A), and withholding of removal pursuant to the 
CAT.  In so doing, the IJ first found that, although 
Chehazeh‟s application for asylum had not been filed within a 
year of his entering the country as required by 
§ 1158(a)(2)(B), his application was still timely because it 
was motivated by “events that ha[d] happened to [him] since 
the time that [he was] arrested,” namely, that he had 
                                              
3
 It is also not clear when Chehazeh was released from 
custody.  He states that he was released sometime after 
August 2002, whereas the INS, in its June 18, 2002 Notice of 
Appeal, reported that he was not detained as of that date. 
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“developed a new fear … after people realized that [he was] 
giving information to the FBI.”4  (App. at 47-48.)   
 
Next, the IJ found Chehazeh to be credible and “an 
exceptional, honest person,” explaining that he had been 
“arrested only because [he] asked the FBI to please accept 
information that [he] felt that [he] had that related to terrorists 
who destroyed the World Trade Center.”  (App. at 48.)  The 
IJ also noted that “the FBI ha[d] carefully examined [his] case 
and [he was deemed] no longer to be of special interest … .  
That mean[t] that what [he‟d] said all along [was] true and 
that [he was] not a danger to the United States and that [he 
was] not involved in any kind of terrorist activities.”  (App. at 
49.) 
 
The IJ then concluded that Chehazeh was a member of 
a social group comprising hopeless debtors who, the IJ 
determined, faced a denial of fundamental rights, including 
the lack of a fair trial and severe prison conditions in Syria.  
The IJ found that, due to Chehazeh‟s membership in that 
group, there was a “clear likelihood of persecution in Syria 
should [he] be returned there” and that “[t]he physical abuse 
that would be lodged against [him] is specifically described 
by the State Department as torture.”  (App. at 60-61.)  As a 
result, the IJ granted his applications for asylum and for 
withholding of removal.   
 
                                              
4
 Although the IJ does not cite it, she may have been 
relying on § 1158(a)(2)(D), which allows an application to be 
considered beyond the one-year period if there are 
“extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an 
application.”   
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The INS appealed to the BIA, claiming that the IJ 
erred by considering Chehazeh‟s asylum application to be 
timely, by finding that he was a member of a social group 
comprising hopeless debtors, and by finding that he would be 
unable to obtain a fair trial in Syria.  The INS also claimed 
that the IJ “should have recused herself due to her inability to 
be fair and impartial.”  (App. at 311.)  With respect to the IJ‟s 
alleged bias, the INS stated: 
 
[The IJ‟s] behavior in this matter … included 
but is not limited to ordering the Service … to 
personally travel to Respondent‟s place of 
detention to assist him in preparing his I-589 
[application for asylum and withholding of 
removal].  When the Service declined, the 
[I]mmigration Judge advised that she would 
assume Respondent had a meritorious claim and 
grant him asylum.  Ultimately, the Immigration 
Judge personally reviewed and completed 
Respondent‟s I-589.  At the time of the 
individual hearing prior to obtaining any 
testimony from Respondent, the Immigration 
Judge advised that she was ready to render a 
decision. 
 
(Id.) 
 
Despite filing an appeal, the INS never submitted any 
briefing and, consequently, the BIA dismissed the appeal on 
August 20, 2004.  The IJ‟s order thus became the final 
outcome of the agency proceedings, or so it appeared. 
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2. The Reopening of Chehazeh’s Removal 
Proceedings 
 
Nearly three years later, on August 9, 2007, the Bureau 
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which 
had succeeded to the responsibilities of the INS,
5
 moved to 
reopen Chehazeh‟s removal proceedings and to terminate his 
asylum.  ICE said that the proceedings should be reopened for 
two reasons.  First, it alleged that “there [was] a showing of 
fraud in [Chehazeh‟s] application.”  (App. at 115.)  
Specifically, ICE stated that Chehazeh‟s claim to be wanted 
by police in Syria was shown to be fraudulent by a later check 
with Interpol revealing that he was not wanted by any 
authority.  Second, ICE asserted that “there [were] reasonable 
grounds for regarding [Chehazeh] as a danger to the security 
of the United States,” due to his interactions with Hanjour and 
al-Hazmi and due to his having obtained a fraudulent driver‟s 
license.  (App. at 116-17.)  ICE also reported that “the FBI is 
unable to rule out the possibility that [Chehazeh] poses a 
threat to the security of the United States.”  (App. at 117.)  
ICE thus argued that the proceedings should be reopened and 
Chehazeh‟s asylum terminated.   
 
In response, Chehazeh argued that ICE‟s motion 
should be denied both because it was not based on any new 
evidence and because it was wrong on its merits.  Regarding 
the purported fraud, Chehazeh pointed out that the report 
from Interpol was from 2003, prior to the dismissal of the 
                                              
5
 See Biskupski v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 274, 276 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“On March 1, 2003, Congress transferred the 
INS‟s functions to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement … .” (citing 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 271 & 291)). 
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INS‟s earlier appeal, and, therefore, it was not new.  He also 
said that his statement that his family told him the Syrian 
authorities were looking for him was not shown to be 
fraudulent simply because an Interpol search showed no 
warrants.
6
  Regarding his alleged threat to national security, 
Chehazeh noted that ICE “merely restate[d] the very facts 
known by law enforcement in 2001 and considered by the IJ,” 
after which the IJ had concluded that Chehazeh was “not a 
danger to the United States.”  (App. at 108.)  Chehazeh 
argued that “[i]t is both unfair and unnecessary to reopen [his] 
case, which was finally determined by this Board over three 
years ago, based on facts that have been known and available 
since 2001.”  (Id.)  
 
On December 13, 2007, without explicitly ruling on 
ICE‟s motion to reopen, the BIA “exercise[d] [its] sua sponte 
authority to reopen proceedings,” pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  (App. at 112.)  The BIA explained that, 
because “the FBI has been unable to rule out the possibility 
that [Chehazeh] poses a threat to the national security of the 
United States. … reopening and remand of proceedings is 
warranted under these circumstances.”  (Id.)  The BIA added 
– though not, it seemed, as a reason for reopening but as an 
instruction for further proceedings – that the remand should 
be “for a new hearing before a different Immigration Judge,” 
because of “instances in the record” that suggested “that the 
Immigration Judge was not conducting the hearings in a 
                                              
6
 Chehazeh‟s brief addressed a number of other 
purported “frauds” that were not discussed in the ICE motion 
but that were mentioned in an affidavit attached to that 
motion. 
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generally fair manner.”7  (App. at 113.)  Chehazeh moved for 
reconsideration of that decision, questioning why the BIA 
“was invoking its sua sponte authority,” despite there being 
no “new, material and previously undiscoverable evidence.”  
(App. at 148.)  In denying that motion, the BIA made its 
concern about bias a reason for reopening, saying in a 
footnote that, “in addition to the unique national security 
issues,” it was exercising its sua sponte authority because it 
“was concerned that the Immigration Judge failed to adhere to 
the role of impartiality assigned to her as one acting in a 
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”  (App. at 152 n.1.) 
 
 3. Chehazeh’s Petition to the District Court 
 
On November 6, 2009, Chehazeh filed in the District 
Court his “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay of 
Removal Proceedings,” listing the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security as respondents.  Chehazeh 
asked the Court to issue an immediate stay of the removal 
proceedings, to declare that the BIA‟s decision to reopen the 
proceedings was contrary to law, and to remand with orders 
for the BIA to reinstate his grant of asylum and to terminate 
the removal proceedings.  He noted that the action arose 
under the APA and asserted that the District Court could 
exercise jurisdiction through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
8
 a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 
                                              
7
 Because the initial decision was sent to a wrong 
address and Chehazeh did not receive notice of it, the BIA 
reissued its decision on October 21, 2008.   
8
 Although Chehazeh was not actually in custody, he 
asserted that the District Court could still exercise habeas 
jurisdiction because he was “subject to removal proceedings 
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U.S.C. § 1361, a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2201, or general federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.   
 
The government moved to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  In particular, the government argued that the 
Court lacked habeas jurisdiction because Chehazeh was not in 
“custody” for purposes of habeas corpus, even though he was 
subject to removal proceedings.  The government also argued 
that the case should be dismissed for several other reasons: 
because the District Court was deprived of jurisdiction by the 
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 
(2005);
9
 because Chehazeh had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies; because the BIA‟s sua sponte 
decision to reopen was unreviewable; and because Chehazeh 
had not shown the extraordinary circumstances necessary for 
a writ of mandamus or that his case was ripe for a declaratory 
judgment.   
 
On May 24, 2010, the District Court granted the 
motion to dismiss, holding that Chehazeh was not in custody 
and therefore there was no basis for habeas jurisdiction.  The 
                                                                                                     
against him, which constitute „significant restraints on 
liberty … not shared by the public generally, along with some 
type of continuing governmental supervision.‟”  (App. at 13 
(quoting Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 717 (3d Cir. 
2003)) (omission in original).) 
9
 Specifically, the government argued that 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g), as amended by the REAL ID Act, 
precluded review of Chehazeh‟s claims.  
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District Court did not address any of the alternative bases for 
jurisdiction identified in Chehazeh‟s petition.  On July 2, 
2010, Chehazeh filed a timely Notice of Appeal to our 
Court.
10
   
 
II. Jurisdiction And Standard Of Review 
 
 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court‟s 
decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether the District 
Court had jurisdiction is the only issue on appeal and is 
discussed below. 
 
 We exercise plenary review over an order dismissing a 
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Taliaferro 
v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
 On appeal, Chehazeh argues that the District Court 
erred by concluding that he was not in custody for purposes 
of habeas review, and that, even if that were correct, the 
Court could have exercised jurisdiction through a writ of 
mandamus or a declaratory judgment and erred by failing to 
address those alternative avenues for relief.  Chehazeh also 
argues that the District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and the APA.  The government responds that 
Chehazeh was not in custody and that, even if some other 
avenue for review (such as the APA) might otherwise be 
available, review is precluded by the REAL ID Act.  The 
                                              
10
 Chehazeh‟s removal proceedings are stayed pending 
the outcome of this appeal, pursuant to an order we entered 
on December 3, 2010.   
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government further contends that Chehazeh has not exhausted 
his administrative remedies and that the BIA‟s exercise of its 
sua sponte reopening authority is unreviewable.   
 
We are persuaded that the District Court has 
jurisdiction under § 1331 and may, under the APA, review 
Chehazeh‟s petition.11  We will therefore reverse and remand.   
                                              
11
 We and other courts of appeals have sometimes 
spoken in terms of “jurisdiction” when addressing judicial 
power to consider petitions for review of BIA decisions 
pursuant to the APA.  See, e.g., Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 
F.3d 472, 475 (3d. Cir. 2003) (dismissing a petition for 
review for “lack of appellate jurisdiction” after determining 
that the “BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to sua 
sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding”); 
Hernandez v. Holder, 606 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction” over the BIA‟s 
decision to deny administrative closure because there was no 
meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA‟s 
decision); Ekimian v. I.N.S., 303 F.3d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction to review 
a BIA decision not to reopen the [removal] proceeding sua 
sponte” because it could not “discover a sufficiently 
meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA‟s 
decision” (emphasis removed)); Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 
(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the court had “no jurisdiction” to 
review the decision of the BIA not to reopen removal 
proceedings sua sponte because “the decision of the BIA 
whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its 
unfettered discretion.”).  That may be viewed, however, as 
too loose a use of that term.  The Supreme Court has said that 
“the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter 
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jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency 
action.”  Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).  Rather, 
the “federal question” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “confer[s] 
jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action.” 
Califano, 430 U.S. at 105; see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281, 317 n. 47 (1979) (“Jurisdiction to review agency 
action under the APA is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”).  “The 
judicial review provisions of the APA,” on the other hand, 
“provide a limited cause of action for parties adversely 
affected by agency action.”  Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 
522, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, if “agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
law,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), or the action is not “final agency 
action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, “a plaintiff who challenges such an 
action cannot state a claim under the APA,” Oryszak, 576 
F.3d at 525, and the action must be dismissed.  See also 
Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the provision of the APA limiting judicial 
review to “final agency action,” does not determine whether a 
federal court has jurisdiction but whether a plaintiff has a 
cause of action).  Accordingly, the Seventh and Eighth 
circuits have recently held that whether a court has the 
authority to review a decision of the BIA under the APA is 
not a jurisdictional question.  Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 
907, 917 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the “issue [of whether 
the court could review the BIA‟s decision to grant 
administrative closure] is not termed properly one of 
jurisdiction … [it] is not a question of whether this court has 
the authority to review, but rather whether the lack of any 
„judicially manageable‟ standard, Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830, 
makes any review within [the court‟s] power, as a practical 
matter, impossible.”); Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549 
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A. The District Court’s Jurisdiction Pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Limitations of the 
APA 
 
 The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
“confer[s] jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency 
action,” “subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created 
or retained by Congress.”  Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 
105 (1977).  The scope and limitations on that review are 
defined by the APA, which permits judicial review for any 
“person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702, so long as the “agency action is [not] committed to 
agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), no “statutes 
preclude judicial review,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), and the 
action is a “final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704.  The form of 
review must conform with any relevant “special statutory 
                                                                                                     
(8th Cir. 2010) (“When a plaintiff complains about an action 
that is committed to agency discretion by law, it does not 
mean that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claim.  Instead, it means that there is no law to apply because 
the court has no meaningful standard against which to judge 
the agency‟s unfettered exercise of discretion.”).   
We agree with the Seventh and Eighth circuits that 
even if Congress has committed discretion to the BIA by law 
to take or not take certain actions, it has not deprived the 
District Court or us of jurisdiction to consider a plaintiff‟s 
claim that such action was erroneous pursuant to the APA.  
The question is whether a plaintiff can state a claim for relief 
from such action under the APA.  See Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 
185 (the APA provides “a limited cause of action for parties 
adversely affected by agency action”). 
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review” provision in the statutes governing the agency.  
Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 703).  “[I]n the absence or inadequacy” of 
any “special statutory review” provision, review may take 
“any applicable form of legal action.”  5 U.S.C. § 703. 
 
We have previously explained that the APA standards 
for determining the reviewability of agency decisions are 
applicable to decision-making in the immigration sphere.  See 
Smriko, 387 F.3d at 290-91 (“Decisions of the BIA are 
agency actions within the meaning of the APA,” and, 
therefore, “we have jurisdiction to review [a BIA decision] so 
long as the INA does not preclude that judicial review and the 
issues so presented are not committed to agency discretion.”); 
M.B. v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding 
that the APA enabled a district court to review the Attorney 
General‟s decision regarding an application for special 
immigration juvenile status because the INA did not preclude 
review of that decision and the decision was not committed to 
agency discretion).  On general principles, then, the District 
Court had jurisdiction over Chehazeh‟s claims under § 1331 
and could have reviewed the BIA‟s decision to reopen 
Chehazeh‟s removal proceedings pursuant to the APA if (1) 
the BIA‟s action was not “committed to agency discretion by 
law,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); (2) no statute precluded review, 5 
U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); (3) the BIA‟s action was a “final agency 
action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704; and (4) no “special statutory review” 
provision required that Chehazeh‟s action be brought in some 
other form or forum, 5 U.S.C. § 703.  We consider each of 
those requirements below. 
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1. The BIA’s Decision to Sua Sponte 
Reopen Removal Proceedings is Not 
Committed to Agency Discretion By Law 
 
 The government, relying on Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 
320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003), and related cases, argues 
that the BIA has “unfettered discretion” (Letter Brief of 
Appellee at 5 (July 15, 2011)) regarding whether to reopen 
removal proceedings and, therefore, a BIA decision to sua 
sponte reopen proceedings is committed to agency discretion 
by law.  Those precedents, however, were based on BIA 
decisions declining to sua sponte reopen removal 
proceedings.  See Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 475 (“[T]his 
court is without jurisdiction to review a [BIA] decision 
declining to exercise [sua sponte] discretion to reopen or 
reconsider [a] case.” (emphasis added)); Alzaarir v. Att’y 
Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 89 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he BIA‟s 
decision not to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. … is a 
discretionary decision beyond our jurisdiction.” (emphasis 
added)).  We have never decided whether a BIA decision to 
reopen, as opposed to declining to reopen, is committed to 
agency discretion.
12
  The government acknowledges that no 
                                              
12
 The government cites to a not precedential opinion 
to support its position.   Not precedential opinions are, by 
definition, not binding on this Court, and our internal 
operating procedures do not allow us to cite and rely upon 
those opinions.  See Internal Operating Procedures 5.7 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
The government also notes our statement from Pllumi 
v. Attorney General that whether to sua sponte reopen is 
“committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA, [and] we 
lack jurisdiction to review a decision on whether and how to 
 19 
 
precedential opinion – in this Circuit or any other – has 
decided whether decisions to reopen are unreviewable, but it 
argues that there is “no principled basis” for distinguishing 
“denials of reopening … from grants of reopening.”  (Letter 
Brief of Appellee at 2 (July 22, 2011).)  We disagree.  The 
distinction between acting and not acting is not merely a 
matter of semantics, and persuasive reasons for making such 
a distinction can be found in precedent from the BIA, this 
Court, and the Supreme Court. 
 
The BIA‟s authority to sua sponte reopen removal 
proceedings comes from 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which states 
that “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its 
own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”  
The regulation provides no guidance on how that authority 
should be exercised, but the BIA has explained that it is not 
boundless: 
 
 [T]he Board retains limited discretionary 
powers under the regulations to reopen or 
reconsider cases on our own motion.  That 
power, however, allows the Board to reopen 
proceedings sua sponte in exceptional situations 
not present here.  The power to reopen on our 
                                                                                                     
exercise that discretion.”  642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Pllumi, however, involved a BIA decision refusing to sua 
sponte reopen.  Id. at 158.  Any suggestion that, for 
reviewability purposes, grants of reopening are the same as 
refusals, could not be more than dicta, uttered without the 
benefit of the arguments that the parties have provided here, 
which have illuminated the meaningful distinction between 
the two. 
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own motion is not meant to be used as a general 
cure for filing defects or to otherwise 
circumvent regulations, where enforcing them 
might result in hardship. 
 
In re J-J-, 21 I. &. N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997) (emphasis 
added) (internal citation omitted).  It is apparent, therefore, 
that the BIA views its authority to reopen as being limited and 
only available in “exceptional situations,” id., not as being 
“unfettered,” despite the government‟s current claim to the 
contrary.  The BIA has consistently relied on that 
“exceptional situations” limitation, applying it more than fifty 
times in the year leading up to its decision to reopen 
Chehazeh‟s case, see e.g., In re Juan Marquez, 2007 WL 
4699844 (BIA Nov. 1, 2007) (“Insofar as the motion requests 
sua sponte reopening, we find that the motion does not 
establish an exceptional situation warranting the exercise of 
our discretionary authority.”); In re Ekins A. Hoyte, 2007 WL 
2463961 (BIA Aug. 2, 2007) (“[W]e find the pending motion 
sufficiently compelling to provide an exceptional 
circumstance warranting a reopening of [respondent‟s] 
record.”); In re Guillermo Lenin Garcia Montenegro, 2007 
WL 1153926 (BIA Mar. 12, 2007) (“[W]e find that an 
exceptional situation exists herein to warrant sua sponte 
reopening of proceedings in the exercise of discretion.”), and 
more than one-hundred times in the past year, see, e.g., In re 
Werner Remberto Orozco-Lopez, 2011 WL 2261236 (BIA 
May 25, 2011) (“We further will not reopen these 
proceedings sua sponte because the respondent has not 
established an exceptional situation to do so.”); In re Elvi 
Antonio Vicente Arias, 2010 WL 5173971 (BIA Nov. 30, 
2010) (“The respondent presents an exceptional situation 
which warrants sua sponte reopening.”); In re Jose Santos 
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Diaz, 2010 WL 4971010 (BIA Nov. 23, 2010) (“The 
respondent does not present an exceptional situation which 
warrants reopening on our own motion.”).13   
 
We have explained that “if an agency „announces and 
follows – by rule or settled course of adjudication – a general 
policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed,‟” 
the exercise of that discretion may be reviewed for abuse.  
Quarantillo, 301 F.3d at 112-13 (quoting INS v. Yang, 519 
U.S. 26, 32 (1996)).  Thus, because the BIA has announced 
and followed a general policy that it will exercise its 
discretion to reopen only in exceptional situations, we may 
review a decision to reopen to determine whether it was based 
upon an exceptional situation. 
 
That conclusion is supported by our reasoning in 
Calle-Vujiles, the case in which we ruled that “decisions not 
to sua sponte reopen or reconsider are non-reviewable.”  320 
F.3d at 473-75.  There, relying on the Supreme Court‟s 
opinion in Heckler v. Chaney, we explained that courts may 
not review matters “where the governing „statute is drawn so 
that a court would have no meaningful standard of review 
against which to judge the agency‟s exercise of discretion.‟”  
Id. at 474 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 
(1985)).  Applying that principle, we explained that, while the 
BIA is “allow[ed] … to reopen proceedings in exceptional 
situations,” it is not “require[d] … to reopen proceedings in 
exceptional situations.”  Id. at 475.  Therefore, because the 
BIA has “unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte 
                                              
13
 In those decisions, the BIA uses the terms 
“exceptional situations” and “exceptional circumstances” 
interchangeably. 
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reopen,” even when there is an exceptional situation, the 
“exceptional situations” requirement provides no meaningful 
standard against which to judge a BIA‟s decision not to 
reopen.  Id. 
 
The same is not true, though, when the BIA chooses to 
exercise its authority to reopen.  According to the BIA‟s own 
“settled course of adjudication,” Quarantillo, 301 F.3d at 112, 
the authority to sua sponte reopen can be exercised only in 
exceptional situations, and, therefore, the “exceptional 
situations” requirement does provide a meaningful standard 
by which to judge the agency‟s action.  The legal difference 
attached to the distinction between denials of reopening and 
grants of reopening is supported – if not mandated – by 
Heckler: 
 
[W]e note that when an agency refuses to act it 
generally does not exercise its coercive power 
over an individual‟s liberty or property rights, 
and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts 
often are called upon to protect. Similarly, when 
an agency does act to enforce, that action itself 
provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch 
as the agency must have exercised its power in 
some manner. The action at least can be 
reviewed to determine whether the agency 
exceeded its statutory powers. 
 
470 U.S. at 832 (emphasis in original).  Heckler‟s guidance is 
of particular import here.  When the BIA refuses to reopen 
proceedings, it puts an end to the administrative process 
without the exercise of any additional “coercive power over 
an individual‟s liberty or property rights.”  Id.  By contrast, 
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when the BIA reopens proceedings, the administrative 
process starts again, potentially placing in jeopardy an 
adjudicated right to stay in this country.   
 
Moreover, if, as the government insists, the BIA has 
unfettered power to reopen, nothing would prevent it from 
reopening and remanding a case to a new immigration judge 
over and over again until satisfied with the outcome.  Neither 
in its briefs nor at oral argument has the government offered 
any suggestion of what would prevent such injustice, other 
than its assurances that we can trust the BIA not to abuse its 
power.  Trust is a fine thing, and the public servants who 
work to enforce our immigration laws – often with little of the 
appreciation they are due – are, no doubt, generally well 
worthy of trust.  But our nation‟s Founders were wise enough 
to know that “trust us” is a poor operating principle for 
government.  Hence they gave us the check of judicial 
review, which is particularly appropriate here because, unlike 
a refusal to reopen, a BIA decision granting reopening has 
implications for substantive liberty rights and for due process 
rights – both of which are “areas that courts often are called 
upon to protect.”  Id.  Just as Heckler was the basis for our 
holding in Calle-Vujiles that the BIA‟s refusal to reopen sua 
sponte is unreviewable, Heckler also counsels against 
extending that rule to situations where the BIA does exercise 
its sua sponte authority.  The import of Heckler is that 
because a BIA decision to reopen proceedings “itself provides 
a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have 
exercised its power in some manner,” that action “at least can 
be reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its” 
settled course of reopening only in exceptional situations.  Id.   
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Our decision in Cruz v. Attorney General, 452 F.3d 
240 (3d Cir. 2006), lends further support to our conclusion on 
this point.  In that case, we remanded a petition to the BIA 
because we could not “tell from its opinion whether the BIA 
concluded that Cruz made out a prima facie case for sua 
sponte relief … but nevertheless exercised its unreviewable 
discretion … to decline to reopen, or whether it believed that 
Cruz had not shown an „exceptional situation,‟ and was 
therefore ineligible … for sua sponte relief.”  Id. at 250.  We 
explained that if it was the latter, “we would have jurisdiction 
to review the BIA‟s decision,” id., which strongly suggests 
that courts have jurisdiction to review the threshold question 
of whether there was an exceptional situation. 
 
 We are thus persuaded that there are indeed principled 
reasons for distinguishing between the reviewability of a BIA 
decision denying reopening and the reviewability of a BIA 
decision granting reopening.  In sum, because the BIA has 
limited its reopening authority only to exceptional situations, 
when it exercises that authority, there is a basis for judicial 
review to determine whether the agency decision was based 
upon an exceptional situation.
14
 
                                              
14
 We recognize that it may not always be obvious 
whether a situation is exceptional.  That, however, is no 
impediment to judicial review.  The “exceptional situations” 
requirement is, in that regard, similar to the requirement 
discussed in Smriko that a decision be streamlined only where 
the “issues raised upon appeal are not so substantial that the 
case warrants the issuance of a written opinion.”  387 F.3d at 
293.  As we explained there, “[t]he fact that [the requirement] 
may require the exercise of some discretion on the part of the 
[BIA] that may be deserving of some deference is, of course, 
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2. No Statute Precludes Review of the BIA’s 
Decision 
 
 The government argues that, to the extent the District 
Court might otherwise have jurisdiction, amendments to the 
immigration laws promulgated by the REAL ID Act preclude 
judicial review.  Specifically, the government cites 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(9) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 
 
(a) 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)  
 
Section 1252(b)(9) states: 
 
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, 
including interpretation and application of 
constitutional and statutory provisions, arising 
from any action taken or proceeding brought to 
remove an alien from the United States under 
this subchapter shall be available only in 
judicial review of a final order under this 
section. Except as otherwise provided in this 
                                                                                                     
not relevant; the APA expressly authorizes review of the 
exercise of discretion for abuse.”  Id.  Determining whether a 
situation is exceptional is no more difficult than determining 
whether factual and legal issues are substantial, and “it will be 
the rare case, indeed, where the reviewing court, having 
received the administrative record and the briefs of the 
parties, will have any difficulty, without more, reaching a 
decision as to whether the [BIA] was so wide of the mark in 
applying [the „exceptional situations‟ requirement] that [its] 
action can be characterized as arbitrary and capricious.”  Id. 
at 293-94.  
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section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by 
habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 or 
any other habeas corpus provision, by section 
1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other 
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to 
review such an order or such questions of law 
or fact.  
 
Based on that provision, the government argues that 
“judicial review of a final order” is the only avenue to review 
any issue arising from a “proceeding brought to remove an 
alien.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).  There is obvious force to that 
reasoning, given the quoted text, but the Supreme Court has 
noted that § 1252(b)(9) is subject to the limitations of  
§ 1252(b), and, therefore, “applies only „[w]ith respect to 
review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).‟”  INS 
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)).
15
  Section 1252(b)(9), “by its own terms,” does 
                                              
15
 Section 1252(b) states: “With respect to review of an 
order of removal under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the 
following requirements apply …”.  Because § 1252(b) only 
applies “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under 
subsection (a)(1),” which, in turn, provides for “[j]udicial 
review of a final order of removal,” the provisions in 
§ 1252(b) only apply when, unlike this case, there is a final 
order of removal issued.  Our dissenting colleague 
nevertheless reads 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) to manifest a clear 
congressional intention to require aliens to secure a final 
order of removal before seeking any type of judicial review of 
any type of order in any type of forum.  (Dissenting Op. at 4; 
see id. (citing § 1252(b)(6) and arguing that we should not 
“circumvent Congress‟s clear intention to allow aliens only 
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not bar review of an order “not subject to judicial review 
under § 1252(a)(1),” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313, and 
§ 1252(a)(1) describes only “review of a final order of 
removal.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (“Judicial review of a 
final order of removal … is governed only by chapter 158 of 
title 28, except as provided in subjection (b) of this 
section … .”).  Section 1252(b)(9), therefore, requires only 
that, when there is an order of removal under subsection 
(a)(1), review of any issues related to that order must be 
consolidated into a single petition for review and cannot be 
brought piecemeal.  One may not, for instance, follow a 
petition for review with a habeas petition or a petition for a 
writ of mandamus.
16
   
                                                                                                     
one opportunity to seek review of a motion to reopen as part 
of the review of the order of removal before a court of 
appeals … .”).)  Section 1252(b)(6) provides: “When a 
petitioner seeks review of an order under this section, any 
review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order 
shall be consolidated with the review of the order.”  Read in 
conjunction with subsection (a)(1), the only thing 
§ 1252(b)(6) clearly does is require a motion to reopen or 
reconsider to be consolidated before us on an appeal when 
there is a final order of removal.  There is no such order here. 
16
 Thus, in Bonhometre v. Gonzales, we stated that 
§ 1252(b)(9), as amended by the REAL ID Act, “effectively 
limit[s] all aliens to one bite of the apple with regard to 
challenging an order of removal, in an effort to streamline 
what Congress saw as uncertain and piecemeal review of 
orders of removal, divided between the district courts (habeas 
corpus) and the courts of appeals (petitions for review).”  414 
F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).  Bonhometre 
reinforces the view that § 1252(b)(9) is aimed at 
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Although St. Cyr issued prior to the REAL ID Act, the 
REAL ID Act did not modify § 1252(b) or the instruction that 
§ 1252(b)(9) “applies only „[w]ith respect to review of an 
order of removal under subsection (a)(1).‟”  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
at 313 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).  Since that time, both the 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that, when a person is 
not seeking review of “an order of removal under subsection 
(a)(1),” the limitations of § 1252(b)(9) do not apply.  See 
Singh v. Gonzalez, 499 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (“By 
virtue of [its] explicit language … 1252(b)(9) appl[ies] only 
to those claims seeking judicial review of orders of 
removal.”); Madu v. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1367 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (explaining that “section 1252(b)(9) applies only 
[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal” and that the 
REAL ID Act “did not expand the scope of  [§ 1252(b)(9)] by 
making it applicable to cases other than those involving 
„review of an order of removal‟” (internal quotation marks 
omitted))); cf. House Conference Report on the REAL ID 
Act, H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 
299 (“[S]ection 106 would not preclude habeas review over 
challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to 
removal orders.  Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas 
review only over challenges to removal orders.”).   
 
While we have not written precedentially on the scope 
of § 1252(b)(9) after the REAL ID Act, we have addressed 
the effect of nearly identical language in § 1252(a)(5).  In 
Kumarasamy v. Attorney General, we considered whether a 
habeas petition that was before us on appeal when the REAL 
                                                                                                     
consolidating all challenges to an order of removal and not 
aimed at consolidating claims arising from administrative 
actions unrelated to an order of removal. 
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ID Act came into effect should be converted into a petition 
for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).  453 F.3d 169, 
172 (3d Cir. 2006).  That subsection states that a “petition for 
review filed with an appropriate court of appeals … shall be 
the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order 
of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).  The petitioner in 
Kumarasamy had not been seeking review of an order of 
removal but was seeking habeas relief, claiming that his 
deportation was illegal “because there was no order of 
removal.”  453 F.3d at 172 (emphasis in original).  We held 
that § 1252(a)(5) did not apply, because that provision 
pertained only to “judicial review of an order of removal.”  
Id. (emphasis in original).  Our holding in Kumarasamy 
supports the conclusion that, because § 1252(b) refers only to 
“review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1),” it, 
and its subsections, are inapplicable when there is no such 
order.
17
 
                                              
17
 The government argues that Kumarasamy actually 
supports its position.  Citing a footnote in Kumarasamy in 
which we explained that § 1252(b)(9) had been amended by 
the REAL ID Act to clarify that it “„preclude[s] any habeas 
corpus review over certain removal-related claims,‟” the 
government asserts that we held that any review of an 
“„action taken or a proceeding brought to remove [an alien]‟” 
is limited by § 1252(b)(9) to review of a final order, “even if 
removal proceedings have not yet commenced or no final 
order of removal is in place.”  (Letter Brief of Appellee at 1-2 
(July 15, 2011) (quoting Kumarasamy, 453 F.3d at 172 n.5).)  
But even if that portion of Kumarasamy is read in the manner 
the government urges – which would place Kumarasamy‟s 
interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) in stark contrast with its 
interpretation of the nearly identical language in § 1252(a)(5) 
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Not all courts agree with the conclusion reached by the 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and suggested by us in 
Kumarasamy.
18
  The First Circuit held in Aguilar v. United 
States Immigration & Customs Enforcement that “the reach of 
section 1252(b)(9) is not limited to challenges to singular 
orders of removal.”  510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).19  The 
                                                                                                     
– Kumarasamy expressly restricts that statement to dicta, 
explaining that we did not need to “reach the question of 
whether §[] 1252(b)(9)” applied because “the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction on [a] separate ground.”  453 F.3d at 172 
n.5.   
18
 In addition to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the 
Tenth Circuit, in dicta, has also stated that 1252(b)(9) applies 
only to review of orders of removal.  See Ochieng v. 
Mukasey, 520 F.3d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008) (“It appears 
that subsequently-enacted provisions of the REAL ID Act 
limiting habeas relief, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) and 
1252(b)(9), do not apply in these circumstances, as Mr. 
Ochieng would not be seeking review of an order of removal, 
but review of his detention.”)  The Eighth Circuit appears to 
acknowledge at least the possibility that § 1252(b)(9) might 
not apply when there is no final order of removal.  See Skurtu 
v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 651, 657-58 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(acknowledging the Ninth Circuit‟s conclusion that 
§1252(b)(9) “by [its] plain language, appl[ies] to only those 
claims seeking judicial review of orders of removal,” but 
concluding that the Skurtu petitioner was, in fact, “seek[ing] 
review of the IJ‟s removal order”). 
19
 Although Aguilar draws a different conclusion than 
we do on the question of the scope of § 1252(b)(9), the 
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reasoning of Aguilar, however, appears to conflict with the 
Supreme Court‟s explicit instruction in St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 
313 (“[Section 1252(b)(9)] applies only „[w]ith respect to 
review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).”), and 
with the language of § 1252(b) (“With respect to review of an 
order of removal under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the 
following requirements apply … .”).  We therefore join with 
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and hold that § 1252(b)(9) 
applies only “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal 
under subsection (a)(1).”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).  Because 
Chehazeh is not seeking review of any order of removal – as 
there has been no such order with respect to him – 
                                                                                                     
reasoning of Aguilar may still allow review of Chehazeh‟s 
claim.  There, the First Circuit explained that, while 
§ 1252(b)(9) is not limited to review of orders of removal, it 
would be “perverse” to read § 1252(b)(9) as encompassing 
claims that, “by reason of the nature of the right asserted, 
cannot be raised efficaciously within the administrative 
proceedings delineated in the INA.”  510 F.3d at 11.  
Congress, it said, “inten[ded] to channel, rather than bar, 
judicial review through the mechanism of section 1252(b)(9)” 
and to read § 1252(b)(9) as encompassing claims “that cannot 
effectively be handled through the available administrative 
process” would be inconsistent with the presumption “that 
there be clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent 
before restricting access to judicial review entirely.”  Id.  As 
discussed at length infra Part III(A)(3)(b), Chehazeh‟s claim 
could not be “raised efficaciously” if it could be brought only 
after a final order of removal.  Thus, even under the First 
Circuit‟s reasoning in Aguilar, § 1252(b)(9) would, it seems, 
not bar review of Chehazeh‟s claim. 
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§ 1252(b)(9) does not preclude judicial review. 
 
  (b) 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) 
 
Section 1252(g), titled “Exclusive jurisdiction,” states: 
 
Except as provided in this section and 
notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 
2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus 
provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such 
title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any 
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien 
arising from the decision or action by the 
Attorney General to commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders 
against any alien under this chapter.  
 
The government argues that Chehazeh‟s claim arises 
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal 
orders, and, therefore, review of that claim before there has 
been a final order is precluded under § 1252(g).  If the 
government‟s position is accepted, then § 1252(g) would 
preclude judicial review of any action related to removal 
proceedings, other than a final removal order, as any such 
claim could be said to “aris[e] from the decision or action by 
the Attorney General to commence proceedings.”  Id.  We 
cannot accept that position.  If § 1252(g) precludes review of 
any action related to removal proceedings with the sole 
exception of a final order of removal, then, by insulating BIA 
decisions to sua sponte reopen proceedings, § 1252(g) 
effectively becomes a “do-over” provision, allowing the BIA 
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to repeatedly remand proceedings to a new IJ until the 
government likes the outcome.  As already discussed, supra 
Part III(A)(1), such a result would give rise to serious due 
process concerns.  
 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has explained that 
§ 1252(g) has a more limited scope than the government 
claims for it.  In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, the Court said that § 1252(g) was designed to 
address only three discrete actions by the Attorney General: 
the “decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
cases, or execute removal orders.”  525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  It is not “a sort of 
„zipper‟ clause that says „no judicial review in deportation 
cases unless this section provides judicial review,‟” as “it is 
implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the 
road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all 
claims arising from deportation proceedings.”  Id.  Instead, 
§ 1252(g) was “directed against a particular evil: attempts to 
impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.”  Id. 
at 485 n.9. 
 
We recognize that BIA decisions may be construed as 
actions of the Attorney General, see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(a)(1) (explaining that the members of the BIA are 
“appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney 
General‟s delegates”), and, therefore, that BIA actions may in 
some cases implicate § 1252(g).  This is not one of those 
cases, however, because the decision to sua sponte reopen 
proceedings is not a prosecutorial decision to “commence 
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.”  
Reno, 525 U.S. at 482.  Rather, it is a quasi-judicial decision 
to reconsider an already adjudicated case.   
 34 
 
 
An argument might be made that a decision to reopen 
is similar enough in character to a decision to adjudicate a 
case in the first instance that any reopening should be 
encompassed within § 1252(g), but we think that position is 
untenable for two reasons.  First, and most importantly, in 
listing the kinds of “decisions or actions that may be part of 
the deportation process” but are not encompassed by 
§ 1252(g), the Supreme Court included the decision “to refuse 
reconsideration of [a removal order].”  Id.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court distinguished between the initial adjudication of a case 
and the reconsideration of that case, declaring that the latter 
was not encompassed within § 1252(g).
20
  Second, as the 
Supreme Court noted, § 1252(g) was “directed against a 
particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon 
prosecutorial discretion.”  Id.  at 485 n.9.  Using the template 
of prosecutorial discretion, one can see that the decision to 
adjudicate a case in the first instance – to indict a criminal 
and bring him to trial – is considered an act of unreviewable 
discretion, but the traditional ambit of that discretion does not 
                                              
20
 We recognize, of course, that refusing to reconsider 
is not the same as reconsidering.  We have already opined 
that there is a material difference between an agency doing 
something and refusing to do something.  Here, however, that 
difference only reinforces our point because, as explained in 
Heckler, when an agency refuses to take action, it is generally 
afforded a greater degree of deference than when it actually 
takes action.  470 U.S. at 832.  Thus, when, as in this instance, 
even the refusal to reconsider a case is not encompassed 
within § 1252(g)‟s protection of prosecutorial discretion, the 
act of reconsidering a case – which is afforded less deference 
– should not be either. 
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include a right for prosecutors to order the relitigation of any 
case they lose.  When the BIA decides to reopen a case, it is 
acting in a quasi-judicial role, similar to a judge granting a 
new trial.  It is not in a prosecutorial role.   
 
According to the Supreme Court‟s analytical construct, 
§ 1252(g) was designed to make unreviewable prosecutorial 
decisions, not quasi-judicial ones.  We therefore conclude 
that, when the BIA reopens removal proceedings, its action 
does not constitute a “decision or action by the Attorney 
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or 
execute removal orders,” and, thus, claims arising from that 
action do not fall within the scope of § 1252(g).  Because 
§ 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9) – the only potential statutory 
barriers identified by the government – do not preclude 
review, there is apparently no statute that precludes judicial 
review of the BIA‟s decision to reopen Chehazeh‟s removal 
proceedings.
21
 
                                              
21 
Nor does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) apply here. In 
Kucana v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies only to “statutory, but not to 
regulatory” grants of discretion.  --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 827, 
831 (2010).  As the Court explained, the BIA‟s power to 
reopen asylum proceedings is specified not in a statute but in 
regulation: “Congress did not codify the regulation delegating 
to the BIA discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen.  See 
8 CFR § 1003.2(a) (reopening may be entertained not only on 
application; the Board „may at any time reopen ... on its own 
motion any case in which it has rendered a decision‟).”  Id. at 
838.  Indeed, it was for that reason, the Court held that “[t]he 
BIA has broad discretion, conferred by the Attorney General, 
„to grant or deny a motion to reopen,‟ 8 CFR § 1003.2(a), but 
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3.  The BIA’s Decision to Reopen 
Chehazeh’s Removal Proceedings is a 
Final Agency Action 
 
(a) The “Collateral Order Doctrine” 
Applies to Review of 
Administrative Decisions 
 
The BIA‟s decision to reopen Chehazeh‟s case was not 
a final disposition of the renewed administrative proceedings.  
Therefore, we must first consider whether agency action that 
does not conclude administrative proceedings may ever be 
considered “final agency action” for purposes of Section 704.   
 
A provision analogous to Section 704‟s “final agency 
action” requirement is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which 
permits appellate review only of “final decisions” of a district 
court.  In that context, it has long been understood that, while 
“a „final decision‟ generally is one which ends the litigation 
on the merits,” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 
(1945), other preliminary decisions may be “final” if they are 
“conclusive,” “resolve important questions completely 
separate from the merits,” and would be “effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying 
action.”  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 
U.S. 863, 867 (1994).  That understanding, known as the 
“collateral order doctrine,” is best seen “not as an exception 
to the final decision rule … but as a practical construction of 
it, which recognizes that [w]hile a final judgment always is a 
final decision, there are instances in which a final decision is 
                                                                                                     
courts retain jurisdiction to review, with due respect, the 
Board‟s decision.”  Id. at 838. 
 37 
 
not a final judgment.”  Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root 
Servs. Inc., 618 F.3d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
While we have never considered whether the collateral 
order doctrine applies to judicial review of agency decisions, 
the nine Courts of Appeals that have addressed the question 
have all concluded that it does.  See Hale v. Norton, 476 F.3d 
694, 698 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the collateral order 
doctrine applies to review of administrative decisions); Rhode 
Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding the 
same and citing cases in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits also holding the same).  
The Supreme Court has likewise strongly suggested that the 
doctrine applies in the administrative context.  See Bell v. 
New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983) (“We conclude that, at 
least in the absence of an appealable collateral order, the 
federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only over a final 
order of the Department [of Education].” (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted)).  We see no reason to depart from 
the unanimous view on the issue and, therefore, join in 
holding that the collateral order doctrine applies to judicial 
review of agency decisions. 
 
(b) The BIA’s Decision is a 
Collateral Order 
 
 Because the BIA‟s decision did not conclude the 
administrative proceedings on the merits, it is reviewable as a 
collateral order only if it (1) is “conclusive,” (2) “resolve[s] 
important questions completely separate from the merits,” 
and (3) would be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from 
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final judgment in the underlying action.”  Digital Equip., 511 
U.S. at 867.   
 
Chehazeh has already availed himself of the only 
administrative remedy available to him – asking the BIA to 
reconsider its decision to reopen – and, therefore, absent 
judicial review, Chehazeh will be forced to go through a 
second round of removal proceedings.  In light of that fact, 
the government does not dispute that the BIA‟s decision is 
“conclusive,” and indeed it is.   
 
The government does argue, however, that the other 
two requirements for collateral review are not present here.  
First, it contends that the BIA‟s decision does not “resolve 
important questions completely separate from the merits,” id., 
because the BIA justified its decision to reopen by citing the 
FBI‟s inability to rule out the possibility that Chehazeh is a 
national security threat.  That argument, though, misses the 
point.  While the question of whether Chehazeh is a national 
security threat does go to the merits of whether he should 
continue to enjoy asylum, the BIA‟s decision neither resolves 
nor even addresses that question.  Instead, the decision 
addresses whether the FBI‟s inability to rule out that 
possibility warranted reopening the proceedings.  The 
question resolved by the BIA, therefore, was whether the 
FBI‟s inability to determine whether a person is a security 
threat gives rise to an exceptional situation justifying 
reopening.  That question is separate from the merits of 
whether Chehazeh is, in fact, a security threat.  Similarly, the 
BIA‟s determination that allegations of IJ partiality justified 
reopening pertains to a question separate from the merits of 
Chehazeh‟s asylum claim.  If the District Court should later 
review the BIA‟s decision, it, likewise, will be tasked not 
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with determining whether Chehazeh is a national security 
threat but with determining whether the FBI‟s inability to rule 
out that possibility, coupled with allegations of IJ partiality, 
constituted exceptional situations.  Both of those questions 
are distinct and separate from the merits of whether 
Chehazeh‟s asylum application should be granted.  We 
therefore conclude that the BIA‟s decision “resolve[s] 
important questions completely separate from the merits.”  Id. 
 
Second, the government contends that the BIA‟s 
decision is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from final 
judgment in the underlying action.”  Id.  In support of that 
argument, the government cites Will v. Hallock, in which the 
Supreme Court held that when a party seeks to avoid trial 
through collateral order review of a pre-trial order, the order 
is reviewable only if there are “compelling public ends.”  546 
U.S. 345, 351-52 (2006).  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
“almost every pretrial or trial order might be called 
„effectively unreviewable‟” and allowing collateral order of 
all of them “would leave the final order requirement of 
§ 1291 in tatters.”   Id. at 351.  That observation is sound but 
inapposite here. 
 
Chehazeh is not seeking collateral review of a pre-trial 
order so as to avoid litigation.  He is seeking, instead, 
collateral review of a post-adjudication order so as to enforce 
the result of an adjudication that has already taken place.  
That there is a legally significant difference between seeking 
to avoid litigation in the first instance and seeking to avoid 
relitigating an issue that has already been decided was 
explicitly recognized in Will, and listed as a “compelling 
public end” that supports collateral order review.  The 
Supreme Court explained that, in the context of a criminal 
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prosecution, while collateral order review was unavailable to 
avoid trial in the first instance because an individual does not 
have “a right to be free of all proceedings whatsoever,” 
collateral order review was available to consider a claim of 
double jeopardy because “the only way to alleviate the[] 
consequences of the Government‟s superior position was by 
collateral order appeal.”  Id. at 352.  Of course, this is not a 
criminal case, and the Double Jeopardy clause is not at issue.  
Nonetheless, the reasons why collateral order review can be 
invoked to avoid double jeopardy, as described in Abney v. 
United States, are instructive here: 
 
[T]he underlying idea, one that is deeply 
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system 
of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its 
resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual 
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity.   
 
431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Should the BIA be free to sua sponte reopen removal 
proceedings, without the possibility of judicial review, 
nothing would prevent it, “with all its resources and power” 
from “mak[ing] repeated attempts to [deport Chehazeh], 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
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and insecurity.”22  Id.  The fact that the government, in this 
case, may not be constitutionally prohibited by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause from using its “resources and power” in a 
particular way does not mean that we should be unconcerned 
by the possible abuse of that power – particularly when, as 
here, that power is supposed to be used only in exceptional 
situations.    
 
Indeed, in Duvall v. Attorney General we recognized 
the magnitude of the concerns raised by repeated relitigation 
when we noted that “[s]ubstantive due process may offer 
some protection against repeated relitigation of the same issue 
by an administrative agency.”  436 F.3d 382, 387 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2006).  For reasons substantially similar to the concerns 
explained above, in Duvall we interpreted the INA as 
incorporating principles of collateral estoppel:  “The 
adversarial system of dispute resolution established in the 
INA is plainly adjudicatory in character and susceptible to 
full application of common law principles of preclusion.”  Id. 
at 390.  As we explained, if that were not true, “[f]ailure to 
satisfy the burden of proof at one hearing before one 
                                              
22
 We have previously applied Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence by analogy in the immigration context.  See 
Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 157 & n.23 (3d Cir. 
2007) (borrowing from Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in an 
immigration case because, although “[a]s a matter of formal 
constitutional doctrine, the Sixth Amendment … does not 
apply in a civil context such as immigration proceedings[,] … 
we cannot treat immigration proceedings like everyday civil 
proceedings … because … the liberty of an individual is at 
stake in deportation proceedings” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
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immigration judge would have no effect on the government‟s 
ability to bring successive proceedings in front of successive 
immigration judges,” and “[t]he same evidence could be 
introduced and the same witnesses could be interrogated, over 
and over, until the desired result is achieved.”  Id. at 388.  
That conclusion comports with a lengthy line of case law in 
this circuit and in our sister circuits.  See, e.g., Alvear-Velez v. 
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that, as 
a general matter, res judicata applies to administrative 
hearings and works to minimize “the expense and vexation 
attending multiple lawsuits”); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. 
Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not always required 
when, for example, “the administrative procedure itself is 
alleged to violate a constitutional right … by subjecting a 
party to „vexatious and harassing‟ prosecutions by refusing to 
apply collateral estoppel”); Cont’l Can Co., U.S.A. v. 
Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 597 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that in 
the administrative adjudication context, it is “rather 
fundamental” and is a “basic tenet of due process” that “the 
Government cannot, without violating due process, needlessly 
require a party to undergo the burdens of litigation” because 
“[t]he Government is not a ringmaster for whom individuals 
and corporations must jump through a hoop at their own 
expense each time it commands” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127 (1959) 
(holding that “the cruelty of harassment by multiple 
prosecutions” can violate the Due Process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment).    
 
This case is not about “mere avoidance of a trial, but 
avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public 
interest” – namely the public‟s interest in “mitigating the 
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government‟s advantage over the individual” and preventing 
the government from using its superior “resources and 
power” to re-run removal proceedings except in exceptional 
situations.  Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53.  Those interests are 
compelling because they “count when asking whether an 
order is „effectively‟ unreviewable if review is to be left until 
later,” id. at 353, because they raise concerns so substantial as 
to implicate the due process clause.  See Duvall, 436 F.3d at 
387 n.5.  Thus, we hold that the BIA‟s order sua sponte 
reopening Chehazeh‟s removal proceedings would be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.  
Because the BIA‟s order is also conclusive, and decides 
important questions separate from the merits of Chehazeh‟s 
asylum claims, it is, pursuant to the collateral order doctrine 
and for purposes of judicial rewiew, the functional equivalent 
of a final agency action.
23
 
                                              
23
 The government also makes the further claim that 
the District Court lacks jurisdiction because Chehazeh has not 
exhausted his administrative remedies.  With respect to the 
harm of being forced to relitigate his case, however, 
Chehazeh has exhausted the only administrative remedy 
available to him – asking the BIA to reconsider its order.  
This is not a case like Duvall v. Elwood, where the alien was 
“„attempting to prevent … deportation proceeding[s] from 
taking place in the first instance,‟” and therefore, had not 
exhausted the remedy of the “deportation … hearing itself.”  
336 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Massieu v. Reno, 
91 F.3d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1996)) (alterations in original).  As 
already discussed, Chehazeh has been through “deportation 
proceeding[s] … in the first instance,” id., and is seeking to 
enforce the result of those proceedings.  Even if we were to 
conclude that Chehazeh had not exhausted his administrative 
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 4.  No “Special Statutory Review” 
Provision Requires that the Action be 
Brought in Some Other Form or Forum 
 
 “Where the governing statute provides for „special 
statutory review‟ … that is the form that the required judicial 
review will take.”  Smriko, 387 F.3d at 291 (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 703).  As previously noted, while a “special statutory 
review” provision dictates the process pertaining to final 
orders of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), (b)(9) (“With 
respect to review of an order of removal … [,][j]udicial 
review of all questions of law and fact … shall be available 
only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”), 
there is no such provision with respect to final or effectively 
final BIA actions besides final orders of removal.  
Consequently, the proceeding may take “any applicable form 
of legal action … in a court of competent jurisdiction,” 5 
U.S.C. § 703.
24
   
                                                                                                     
remedies, however, there is an exception to the exhaustion 
requirement when the claim for which review is sought is 
wholly collateral to the merits of the administrative 
proceedings.  Massieu, 91 F.3d at 422-23.  As discussed 
above, Chehazeh‟s claim that the BIA erred in reopening his 
removal proceedings is collateral to the merits of those 
proceedings.  
24
As mentioned supra at note 15, our dissenting 
colleague believes that Congress intended a final order of 
removal to be a condition precedent to judicial review before 
a federal appellate court.  (Dissenting Op. at 4; see id. at 13-
14 n.8 (“If the established procedures are allowed to go 
forward as provided in the statute, … Chehazeh will be able 
to obtain review of the decision reopening the case upon 
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Thus, because no statute precludes review of the BIA‟s 
decision, which is effectively final and not committed to 
agency discretion by law, the District Court has jurisdiction to 
review the decision.  We will therefore reverse its order 
dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
B. Whether the BIA’s Decision is Justified by 
an “Exceptional Situation” 
 
Because the District Court believed that it did not have 
jurisdiction over Chehazeh‟s petition, it never addressed 
whether the BIA‟s decision to reopen proceedings was 
warranted by an exceptional situation.  We may decide a 
question not addressed by the District Court when “the record 
has been sufficiently developed for us to resolve [the] legal 
issue.”  In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 306 
(3d Cir. 1999).  Here, the BIA offered two justifications for 
its decision: that “the FBI has been unable to rule out the 
                                                                                                     
conclusion of the proceedings.”).)  Thus, he rejects our 
conclusion that no special statutory review provision requires 
that the action be brought in some other form or forum, and 
he points to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) as support.  That 
statute, however, is not apposite.  It provides that the 
provisions limiting or eliminating judicial review in the Real 
ID Act do not extend to constitutional or legal questions 
which the court of appeals may properly consider 
notwithstanding § 1252(a)(2)‟s list of “[m]atters not subject 
to judicial review.”  It does not speak at all to the question of 
whether relief under the APA must be sought in a particular 
forum, and it certainly does not establish a rigid protocol 
whereby an alien must be ordered removed by the BIA before 
pursuing any relief in any forum.  
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possibility that the respondent poses a threat to the national 
security of the United States,” (App. at 112) and that the BIA 
was “concerned that the Immigration Judge failed to adhere to 
the role of impartiality assigned to her as one acting in a 
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” (App. at 152.)  We 
conclude that the record is insufficient for us to determine 
whether either of those alleged situations are exceptional, 
and, therefore, we will remand to the District Court. 
 
With respect to the BIA‟s first proffered reason – the 
FBI‟s inability to rule out the possibility that Chehazeh is a 
national security threat – a “blink” response is that it may not 
be exceptional.  “[P]roving a negative is a challenge in any 
context,” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring), and if the BIA were able to reopen 
any proceeding in which the FBI was “unable to rule out the 
possibility” that a person was a security threat, reopening may 
perhaps become a regular occurrence and hardly exceptional.  
Moreover, the facts known at the time of the initial removal 
proceedings led the IJ to conclude that Chehazeh was “not a 
danger to the United States and that [he was] not involved in 
any kind of terrorist activities” – a conclusion based on “the 
FBI ha[ving] carefully examined [his] case” and determining 
that he was “no longer to be of special interest.”  (App. at 49.)  
The government never pursued its appeal of that decision.  
Nor, in moving to reopen, has the government offered any 
new facts suggesting that Chehazeh was, or has become, a 
security threat.  Allowing the BIA to reopen under these 
circumstances would thus appear to circumvent the general 
requirement that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted 
unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be 
offered is material and was not available … at the former 
hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).   
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The BIA has plainly stated that its sua sponte authority 
is not designed to “circumvent the regulations.”  In re J-J-, 21 
I. & N. Dec. at 984.  That authority may, of course, have the 
effect of circumventing the regulations when an exceptional 
situation calls for it, but wherever the line between an 
unexceptional situation and an exceptional situation lies, we 
wonder whether – on this record – this case is near it.  
Nevertheless, we cannot say whether the FBI might have 
heretofore-undiscussed criteria by which it can, in ordinary 
circumstances, effectively rule out aliens as security threats, 
and we certainly cannot say with assurance that there was not 
an exceptional reason for some change in the FBI‟s 
assessment of Chehazeh.  Thus, the record is insufficient for 
us to decide the issue.  
 
 With respect to the concern that “the Immigration 
Judge failed to adhere to the role of impartiality assigned to 
her as one acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity,” 
(App. at 152), the BIA has not given much detail regarding 
the allegedly problematic conduct.  Most of what we know is 
from the INS appeal from the initial IJ decision, in which, 
among other things, the INS asserted that the IJ had ordered it 
“to assist [Chehazeh] in preparing his [application for asylum 
and withholding of removal],” or else she would “assume [he] 
had a meritorious claim and grant him asylum,” and that, 
“[u]ltimately, the Immigration Judge personally reviewed and 
completed [his application].”  (App. at 311.) 
 
If, in fact, those allegations are true, they certainly 
seem unusual and may warrant categorizing the 
circumstances as exceptional.  But, again, based on the record 
before us, we cannot make that determination.  We will 
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therefore remand to the District Court to allow the parties to 
supplement the record so that that Court can “review the 
whole record,” 5 U.S.C. § 706, to determine whether there 
was an exceptional situation that warranted reopening 
Chehazeh‟s removal proceedings.     
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court‟s order dismissing Chehazeh‟s petition for lack of 
jurisdiction and will remand for the District Court to consider 
whether the BIA‟s decision to reopen Chehazeh‟s removal 
proceedings was warranted by an exceptional situation. 
 
1 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting, 
 Since I conclude that Congress has established a 
clearly defined system for the courts to review decisions of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖), which requires 
that petitions for review be filed with the courts of appeals, 
and not the district courts, I find that I must respectfully 
dissent from the majority‘s opinion.   Congress, by enacting 
the REAL ID Act, vested courts of appeals with jurisdiction 
to review orders reopening removal proceedings.  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(6).
1
  This specific statutory authority overrides the 
application here of the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (―APA‖), and undermines the majority‘s 
reasoning.   
 The majority sets forth the factual and procedural 
history of this matter in thorough detail. I have nothing to 
add.  Similarly, the majority clearly recites the factors we 
must review in determining whether the APA applies.  As 
they state, review under the APA is available  
if (1) the BIA‘s action was not 
―committed to agency discretion 
by law,‖ 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); (2) 
no statute precluded review, 5 
U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); (3) the BIA‘s 
action was a ―final agency 
action,‖ 5 U.S.C. § 704; and (4) 
                                              
1
  Section 1252(b)(6) provides that ―[w]hen a petitioner 
seeks review of an order under this section, any review sought 
of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order shall be 
consolidated with the review of the order.‖   
  
2 
 
no ―special statutory review‖ 
provision required that 
Chehazeh‘s action be brought in 
some other form or forum, 5 
U.S.C. § 703.   
Majority Dec. at 17. 
 While I think the majority‘s reasoning on factors (1)2 
and (3)
3
 is open to debate, my principal point of disagreement 
                                              
2
  While I agree with the majority‘s ultimate 
conclusion that the BIA‘s decision in this case is not 
discretionary, I would reach that decision by a different, and 
somewhat shorter, path.  The government‘s motion, filed 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24, sought to reopen the 
proceedings in order to terminate Chehazeh‘s asylum and 
withholding of removal.  Section 1208.24(f) sets forth 
specific criteria that the government must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence during the reopened 
proceeding in order to terminate the alien‘s asylum or 
withholding of removal.  Arguably, the government, in its 
motion to reopen, would have to demonstrate a likelihood of 
success in proving at least one of these factors.  As a result, 
the BIA‘s decision to reopen would not be discretionary.  
Rather, the BIA would be required to evaluate the specific 
factors set forth in the regulations in reaching its decision on 
reopening.   
 
3
  I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the 
BIA‘s decision to reopen this case constitutes final agency 
action.  I explain my views more fully infra.  
 
3 
 
focuses on factor (4).
4
  Congress has developed a statutory 
scheme that vests responsibility for judicial review of 
immigration decisions in the courts of appeals, and explicitly 
directs that review of BIA decisions on motions to reconsider 
and reopen be consolidated with the review of orders of 
removal.  Given Congress‘s efforts to remove district courts 
from the responsibility of reviewing immigration decisions, 
why should we extend that authority here?  I also believe that 
Congress‘s explicit provision of a method of review for 
motions to reconsider and reopen undermines the majority‘s 
APA argument.    
 As the majority notes, Smriko v. Ashcroft allows for 
application of the APA only ―in the absence or inadequacy‖ 
of any ―special statutory review‖ provisions.  387 F.3d 279, 
290-91 (3d Cir. 2004).  In the present case, there are two 
statutes, given short shrift by the majority, that provide for 
review of immigration decisions, including motions to 
reopen.  First, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that  
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or 
(C), or in any other provision of 
this chapter (other than this 
section) which limits or eliminates 
judicial review, shall be construed 
as precluding review of 
constitutional claims or questions 
                                              
4
  I agree with the majority‘s conclusion in section 
III.A.2.a. that no statute precludes judicial review of the 
BIA‘s decision.  That discussion, however, focuses only on 
the impact of the REAL ID Act on the review of habeas 
corpus petitions vis- à-vis review of orders of removal.  I find 
that analysis inapposite to the question presently before us.   
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of law raised upon a petition for 
review filed with an appropriate 
court of appeals in accordance 
with this section.  
This provision removes the authority to review legal and 
constitutional claims from district courts.  The APA basis for 
jurisdiction is only available if no ―special statutory review‖ 
provision requires that the action be brought in some other 
forum.  Here, Congress has provided a basis for review before 
our Court, not the district court.  The statute does not prohibit 
judicial review, but it does limit that review to the courts of 
appeals.   
 Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) provides that ―[w]hen a 
petitioner seeks review of an order under this section, any 
review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order 
shall be consolidated with the review of the order.‖  I do not 
believe we can circumvent Congress‘s clear intention to allow 
aliens only one opportunity to seek review of a motion to 
reopen as part of the review of the order of removal before a 
court of appeals by reading the APA to provide jurisdiction to 
the district court.   
 For decades, Congress has expressed its desire to 
streamline immigration proceedings, endeavoring to ―create a 
single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of 
administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of 
aliens from the United States.‖  H.R. Rep. No. 72, 109th 
Cong., 1
st
 Sess., reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 297 
(2005) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87
th
 Cong. 1
st
 Sess., 
5 
 
reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966 (1961)).
5
  
―Congress‘s ‗fundamental purpose‘ was ‗to abbreviate the 
process of judicial review of deportation orders‘ and to 
‗eliminat[e] the previous initial step in obtaining judicial 
review – a suit in a District Court.‘‖  Id. (quoting Foti v. INS, 
375 U.S. 217, 224 (1963)).   
 ―Congress continued these streamlining reforms when 
it enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104–208, 110 
Stat. 3546 (Sept. 30, 1996).‖  Id. at 298.  The amendments in 
                                              
5
 ―Before [the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996], individuals who were 
‗ineligible for admission into the United States and were 
never admitted into the United States were referred to as 
‗excludable,‘ while aliens who had gained admission, but 
later became subject to expulsion from the United States, 
were referred to as ‗deportable.‘‘  After IIRIRA, aliens who 
were previously referred to as ‗excludable‘ are termed 
‗inadmissible,‘ and the term ‗removal proceedings‘ covers 
proceedings applicable to both inadmissible and deportable 
aliens.  Thus, a reference to an order of removal would 
encompass an order of deportation.‖  Avila-Macias v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
―The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), eliminated the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (―INS‖) and assigned INS‘s 
enforcement functions to the [Department of Homeland 
Security]‘s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(―ICE‖).‖  Khouzam v. Atty. Gen‘l, 549 F.3d 235, 243 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
6 
 
IIRIRA ―were intended to preclude all district court review of 
any issue raised in a removal proceeding.‖  Id.  The 2005 
amendments were directed at correcting anomalies created by 
the Supreme Court‘s decision in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr¸533 U.S. 
289 (2001) with respect to judicial review of the removal 
proceedings for criminal aliens.  One purpose of the 
amendments was to ensure that ―all aliens will get review in 
the same forum – the courts of appeals.‖  2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 299.  The amendment ―would give every alien one day in 
the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional concerns.‖  Id.  
―By placing all review in the courts of appeals, [the 
amendments] would provide an ‗adequate and effective‘ 
alternative to habeas corpus.‖  Id. at 300 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. at 381). 
 Further, Congress‘s action in consolidating review of 
motions to reopen with review of the order of removal is 
consistent with the established practice in appellate review of 
civil cases involving motions to reconsider, motions to 
reopen, and decisions vacating default judgment.  For 
example, ―[o]rders granting a motion to vacate [default 
judgment] should be treated in the same way as orders 
granting a new trial [both of which] set[] the stage for further 
trial court proceedings [and are] not final.  Appeal is properly 
taken upon conclusion of the proceedings set in motion by the 
order vacating the judgment.‖  15B Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 3916 (2d ed.) (footnotes omitted).  Indeed, ―[a]n 
order granting a new trial . . . ordinarily is not final; review is 
supposed to be available only after completion of the new 
trial.‖  Id. at § 3915.5.   ―Denial of immediate appeal from an 
order granting a new trial means that the order merges in, and 
is reviewable on appeal from, the final judgment entered after 
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the new trial or other event that concludes the litigation.‖  Id.   
―Few theories are likely to help a party who is anxious to 
bend the final judgment rule to permit appeal from an order 
granting a new trial.‖  Id. 
―Congress is expected to legislate against the backdrop 
of well-established common law principles.‖  Duvall v. Att‘y 
Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 2006).  That is exactly what 
Congess did in enacting § 1252(b)(6) – Congress recognized 
the principle that in granting a motion to reopen, the BIA sets 
in motion a new proceeding, which should be allowed to 
continue to its conclusion before review is sought of any 
stage of that proceeding.  By seeking review of the decision 
reopening his removal proceedings in the District Court, 
Chehazeh sought to bypass the procedures established by 
Congress based on common law principles.   
 Given the clear directive of § 1252(b)(6), I find the 
majority‘s discussion of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to be unnecessary 
to the analysis of the question before us.
6
  Congress has 
removed any ambiguity regarding when review of a decision 
on a motion to reopen or reconsider is to be had.  That review 
is before the appropriate court of appeals, in conjunction with 
the review of the order of removal.  The majority expressed 
great concern that ―§ 1252(g) effectively becomes a ‗do-over‘ 
provision.‖  Majority Dec. at 32.  Rather than insulating 
                                              
6
 I find the majority‘s discussion of Kucana v. Holder, 
130 S.Ct. 827 (2010) unnecessary.  Although the government 
moved to reopen pursuant to a regulation, as discussed supra, 
I do not find that the decision to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.24 is discretionary.  Therefore, the distinction between 
statutory and regulatory discretion is not necessary to the 
resolution of this case.    
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decisions to reopen and reconsider from review, Congress 
provided an explicit mechanism for an alien to obtain review 
of these decisions.   I therefore cannot share the majority‘s 
concern that aliens will be prevented from seeking review of 
a decision to reopen.  To be sure, that review will be delayed 
until a final order of removal is entered, but I perceive no 
harm to the alien in following that procedure since it reflects 
Congress‘s legislative intent in adopting the REAL ID Act 
and there is no constitutional violation resulting from such a 
procedure.   
 To the contrary, I fear that the majority‘s decision will 
create a situation similar to that in Duvall where our Court 
expressed concern that Duvall‘s refusal to testify as to her 
citizenship during her removal proceeding ―would effectively 
preclude the INS from ever relitigating the issue of alienage 
or ever securing removal, despite the alien‘s ongoing criminal 
conduct.‖  Duvall, 436 F.3d at 391.  Here, the government 
presented evidence to the BIA that Chehazeh may have 
committed fraud during his original asylum application 
proceeding.  The BIA reopened the matter and remanded to 
an immigration judge so that the evidence could be presented 
more fully and the allegations of fraud evaluated by the 
appropriate factfinder.  By allowing Chehazeh to seek review 
of the decision to reopen before the District Court, absent a 
full exploration of the facts by an immigration judge, the 
majority creates a situation where an alien could lie during 
their asylum proceeding, and then never be put to task 
regarding that lie before the immigration authorities.   
 In satisfying the third factor — finality of the agency‘s 
decision — the majority applies the collateral order doctrine.  
Analogizing to review of a post-judgment order in a criminal 
proceeding where double jeopardy concerns exist, the 
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majority finds that the BIA‘s decision to reopen is effectively 
unreviewable if left until a later time in the litigation.  
Majority Dec. at 39-43.  I disagree with this conclusion for 
several reasons.  Most importantly, in the statute Congress 
has explicitly provided for review of the BIA‘s decision to 
reopen.  Second, both the Supreme Court and our Court have 
consistently held that application of the collateral order 
doctrine should be the exception, not the rule.  Third, I am 
disinclined to imbue immigration proceedings with the 
constitutional protections associated with double jeopardy 
review.   
 Having already discussed the statutory directive set 
forth in § 1252(b)(6), I turn to the general principles 
underlying application of the collateral order doctrine.  The 
Supreme Court has emphasized its view that the collateral 
order doctrine should be invoked rarely.
7
  Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009).  That is, ―[i]n 
applying Cohen‘s collateral order doctrine, we have stressed 
that it must ‗never be allowed to swallow the general rule that 
a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final 
judgment has been entered.‘‖  Id. at 605 (quoting Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 
(1994)). 
 Given these strong statements on the narrow scope of 
the collateral order doctrine, I do not think it is applicable 
                                              
7
   ―[W]e have not mentioned applying the collateral 
order doctrine recently without emphasizing its modest 
scope.‖  Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006).  
―[A]lthough the Court has been asked many times to expand 
the ‗small class‘ of collaterally appealable order, we have 
instead kept it narrow and selective in its membership.‖  Id. 
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here.  The majority analogizes the present situation to that in 
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), where the 
collateral order doctrine was applied to prevent the 
government from ―using its resources and power . . . to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual,‖ and to protect the 
individual from the concomitant ―embarrassment, expense 
and ordeal‖ associated with multiple prosecutions.  Id. at 661-
62.  Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that an order 
denying a defendant‘s motion to dismiss an indictment on 
double jeopardy grounds was reviewable under the collateral 
order doctrine.  The Court noted that ―the very nature of a 
double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and 
separable from the principal issue at the accused‘s impending 
criminal trial.‖  Id. at 659.   
 The situation presented by this case differs from that in 
Abney in important ways.  The issues raised in the motion to 
reopen are not collateral to or separable from the issues 
underlying the asylum application.  Rather, the new facts 
introduced by the government directly address, among other 
points, the question of whether or not Chehazeh committed 
fraud during the original asylum proceeding.   
 Additionally, as the Supreme Court has observed, ―[a] 
deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine 
eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful 
entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country 
is itself a crime. . . . Consistent with the civil nature of the 
proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a 
criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.‖  I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).   
 Further, our court has noted that ―[w]hile an alien may 
be eligible for a grant of asylum or an adjustment of status 
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under the immigration laws, he is not entitled to such benefits 
as a constitutional matter.  There is no constitutional right to 
asylum per se.  An alien seeking admission to the United 
States through asylum ‗requests a privilege and has no 
constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power 
to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.‘‖  
Mudric v. Att‘y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal 
citations omitted).   
 With those admonitions in mind, I turn to the third 
prong of the collateral order test — whether the matter at 
hand will be effectively unreviewable later.  The Supreme 
Court discussed this factor in Mohawk Indus.  There, the 
Court observed that  
―the third Cohen question, 
whether a right is ‗adequately 
vindicable‘ or ‗effectively 
reviewable,‘ simply cannot be 
answered without a judgment 
about the value of the interests 
that would be lost through 
rigorous application of a final 
judgment requirement.‖  That a 
ruling ―may burden litigants in 
ways that are only imperfectly 
reparable by appellate reversal of 
a final district court judgment . . . 
has never sufficed.‖ Instead, the 
decisive consideration is whether 
delaying review until the entry of 
final judgment ―would imperil a 
substantial public interest‖ or 
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―some particular value of a high 
order.‖  
Id. at 605 (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm‘n, 514 
U.S. 35, 42 (1995); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 872, 878-879; 
and Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-353 (2006)). 
 The majority expresses concern over the government‘s 
ability to continue to challenge Chehazeh‘s grant of asylum, 
forcing him to relitigate an issue that was already decided.  
Majority Dec. at 39.  I do not share that concern.  The issue 
that will be addressed in the reopened proceeding is the 
question of whether or not Chehazeh committed fraud during 
his original asylum application.  Requiring Chehazeh to 
defend himself in a second proceeding does not ―imperil a 
substantial public interest.‖  To the contrary, I believe 
thoroughly examining the possible fraud in his original 
asylum application is a substantial public interest that should 
be protected.  Relitigating his asylum application may place 
an additional burden on Chehazeh, but that burden is not 
insurmountable, and is presumably an unusual circumstance.  
 Further, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) requires that review of 
a motion to reopen be consolidated with the review of the 
removal order.  Congress has spoken clearly on this issue and 
concluded that review should be had in a single appeal.  As a 
result, Chehazeh would be able to obtain review of the motion 
to reopen in the future.   
 Motions to reopen are filed often in immigration 
proceedings, and some of those motions are granted.  In most, 
if not all, of those cases, the litigants seek review in the 
appropriate court of appeals, as required by the statute.  The 
only aspect of this case that makes it, as the majority notes, 
13 
 
―highly unusual‖ is Chehazeh‘s decision to seek review in the 
District Court, rather than before us.
 8
   In the REAL ID Act, 
                                              
8
  Had Chehazeh sought review before our court in the 
first instance, I would have dismissed the appeal as untimely, 
as is our normal practice.  See, e.g., Dajuste v. Att‘y Gen., 
C.A. No. 11-2652 (3d Cir. Aug. 2, 2011) (order) (dismissing 
the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because the 
motion to reopen was granted and the proceedings are 
therefore ongoing before the immigration judge).  The parties 
would then have been able to develop the factual record 
before an immigration judge, rather than before the District 
Court, as the majority directs.   
 
The majority cites Kumarasamy v. Att‘y Gen., 453 
F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2006), for the proposition that review is 
available in the courts of appeals only from a final order of 
removal.  In Kumarasamy, the alien, who had been removed 
from this country, sought habeas review in the district court, 
arguing that the removal was illegal since no order of removal 
existed.  The alien persisted in this argument, even after the 
government submitted a copy of the order of removal.  The 
district court dismissed the habeas petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.   
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Congress clearly vested responsibility for review of BIA 
decisions with the courts of appeals.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  By filing his petition seeking review of the 
BIA‘s decision to reopen his case with the District Court, 
Chehazeh attempted to circumvent the method of review 
established by Congress.  I cannot condone his attempt to do 
so.  I would affirm the District Court‘s decision finding that it 
lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter.
9
    
                                                                                                     
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the 
REAL ID Act, which vested jurisdiction for review of orders 
of removal with the courts of appeals.  The REAL ID Act also 
required that habeas petitions challenging orders of removal 
before district courts or pending on appeal would be 
converted to petitions for review of the removal order.  We 
concluded that Kumarasamy‘s habeas appeal should not be 
converted to a petition for review since Kumarasamy argued 
that no order of removal existed.   
 
Here, no order of removal exists because Chehazeh 
sought, by filing for review before the District Court, to avoid 
the procedures established by Congress.  If the established 
procedures are allowed to go forward as provided in the 
statute, and as is the normal practice in civil cases, Chehazeh 
will be able to obtain review of the decision reopening the 
case upon conclusion of the proceedings.   
 
9
  I would also conclude that Chehazeh was not in 
custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction.   
